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ARTICLES 
Fiscal policy, public sector management 
and the 1989 health sector strike 
Pat Walsh* and Geoff Fougere t 
This paper argues that the 1989 health sector strike grew out of the combined effects of 
the Labour Government's fiscal policies and its new approach to public sector 
management. These policies gave rise to a new and not well understood political and 
industrial environment which held unexpected hazards for all parties. The course and 
outcomes of the dispute were not under the control of any party, all of whom learnt, as 
they went along, what the new industrial and political environment held for them. 
On February 14, 1989 New Zealand experienced a major, national strike in the health 
sector. It was the first time that coordinated strike action had been taken on a national 
basis involving the bulk of workers and a joint campaign by the major health unions.l 
In this paper, we offer an explanation of why the strike took place by placing it in the 
context of new patterns of public sector management and industrial relations. These 
patterns are not unique to health, but exemplify in many ways emerging developments 
throughout the state sector. 
The health sector strike, we will argue, resulted from the combined impact of current 
policy developments in fiscal and public sector management. The choice of a particular 
model of public sector management - exemplified by but not confined to the State Sector 
Act and associated legislation such as the Area Health Board Amendment Act and the 
Hospitals Amendment Act - was in part shaped by the Government's fiscal strategy. This 
* 
t 
Industrial Relations and Public Policy, Victoria University of Wellington 
Department of Community Health, Wellington School of Medicine. 
The order of authorship was determined by flipping a coin. We would like to thank the 
many people in both unions and management, and elsewhere, who have assisted us in 
our research for this paper, and those who commented on an earlier draft. 
In this paper we deal only with the Public Service Association, the Service Workers 
Federation and the New Zealand Nurses Association. While unions representing local 
authority employees joined the union campaign part way through and unions 
representing trades groups also had some involvement, we have focussed our attention 
on the three major unions only. 
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legislation in turn reordered the distribution of resources within health sector industrial 
relations. In particular, it shaped the parties' definition of their interests, their choice of 
objectives and the strategies they adopted. In 1988/89 unions and employers faced a new 
environment. Its dimensions unfolded to them over the course of the dispute as the 
parties learnt what it offered and what it ruled out. The outcomes were certainly not those 
intended by the architects of the State Sector Act. The Act was conceived as an 
empowering agent for management. It was this, but in other unexpected and unintended 
ways it also empowered unions and hobbled management. This latter development 
revealed itself through the events of the health sector strike.2 
Fiscal policy 
By 1987 fiscal policy had become a central policy concern. There were at least three 
major, related reasons for this. The first was nil growth and lower rates of nominal wage 
increases, both products of Government policy, which meant the increasing tax revenue 
from rising GDP and fiscal drag that it had inherited from its predecessor were no longer 
available. Secondly, the Government had almost exhausted its opportunities to 
restructure the tax system so as to increase overall tax take. Thirdly, these constraints on 
raising revenue led to a fierce battle within the Government over expenditure. The issue 
became defined as a key test of government credibility by the newly powerful financial 
sector, farmers and some sectors of big business. 
These urgent fiscal concerns converged with the Government's wider policies in state 
sector management. The result was that on December 10, 1987, the Government 
introduced the State Sector Bill into Parliament and a week later issued the now notorious 
December 17 tax package. Although particular details of the December 17 package were 
later spectacularly repudiated by the Prime Minister, its major emphasis upon fiscal 
restraint was preserved in the 1988 Budget. For our purposes, the Budget's key 
provisions were: 
a) Departments had to absorb a third of the cost of the 1987 wage round and any 
additional wage-related costs in the 1988 financial year. As the Minister of 
Finance noted, this required a department wishing to increase its spending on staff 
to find equivalent savings elsewhere in its budget. 
b) Departments were required to absorb virtually all price increases relating to their 
operating expenses. 
c) Departments were required to live within their budgets and not to expect 
supplementary allocations later in the financial year. Any new operational 
policies were to be funded within the main estimates allocation. 
In the past the Department of Health had sheltered boards from periodic budget 
constraints imposed by central government by making adjustments to its own operations. 
On this occasion the amount was simply too large. Four months into the financial year 
Hospital and Area Health Boards were told that their allocations would be three percent 
less than they had budgeted for. This meant that the full cost of any pay increases, 
2 The approach taken here reflects our preference for institutionalist theorising 
(Ikenberry, 1988; March and Olsen, 1984; Krasner, 1988). In this view, outcomes are 
seen as resulting from the interaction of strategic choices made by participants with 
institutional structures. The interests and objectives of the participants and the 
strategic choices they make are constrained by the resources allocated and the range of 
options made possible by existing institutional arrangements. Outcomes are not 
controlled by any one participant, but are shaped by the particular mix of strategy and 
structure that prevails. We have previously applied a similar theoretical approach to 
other aspects of industrial relations in New Zealand (Walsh and Fougere, 1987; Walsh, 
1989). 
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previously funded by additional funds from central government, would have to be met 
from within the boards' own current allocations. Boards had had no warning that this 
level of restraint would be imposed upon them. To their consternation, managers faced a 
pay round with apparently no money to put on the table. 
Public sector management 
The provisions of the State Sector Act were crucial to implementing these policies of 
fiscal restraint. Prior to the Act, funding of pay increases in the health sector was 
guaranteed by arrangements known as stabilisation, under which central government 
reimbursed Boards for wage rises. These wage rises were generated in a number of ways, 
none of which the Government fully controlled. Most workers in health, as throughout 
the state sector, received their annual wage increase through the Annual General 
Adjustment (AGA). This was an estimate of the average private sector wage increase 
based upon data from the Department of Labour's Quarterly Employment Survey. Some 
workers gained an additional pay increase through an occupational class pay claim. 
Negotiations over these claims could ultimately be resolved by compulsory arbitration by 
the appropriate tribunal. Yet other groups in health relied upon a state linkage clause by 
which they also received the AGA. Since 1985, most of those workers had discarded their 
state linkage clause and negotiated awards and agreements under the Labour Relations Act. 
Ironically, the tight linkage between private and state sector pay and the availability of 
compulsory arbitration meant that the Government's most effective means of controlling 
state pay increases operated through whatever influence it could bring to bear upon private 
sector outcomes. 
These pay-fixing arrangements ensured that only infrequently were pay increases 
related to the specific circumstances of the health sector. A similar situation applied with 
regard to the negotiation of conditions of employment. These were settled in what were 
called block negotiations covering the whole state sector. It was also possible for 
specific issues to be dealt with by way of administrative agreements. However, the bulk 
of employment conditions in health were settled by a process external to the health 
sector. 
The State Sector Act had dual policy objectives. On the one hand, it was intended to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the core state sector and thus help the 
Government realise its public sector management policy objectives. On the other hand, 
the Act was intended as an instrument of fiscal management. It abolished the AGA and 
compulsory arbitration and eliminated block service-wide negotiations on conditions of 
employment. All workers were now required to negotiate pay and conditions in direct 
bargaining with employers. This made 'hard budgets' possible for the first time in the 
state sector. Previously, a government bent on fiscal restraint could find its policy 
undone by the AGA's transfer of large private sector pay increases to state employees, or 
by a Tribunal ordering a substantial increase for an occupational class. (The Higher 
Salaries Commission's determination in 1985 was for the Government an egregious 
example of this and obviously a catalyst for the State Sector Act.) Funding levels were a 
consequence of decisions already made about pay increases rather than shaping those 
decisions. Now, the negotiating parameters could be set by prior Government budgetary 
decisions. 
The pay round 
Hard budgets set limits to industrial strategies in the health sector. Because the 
amounts available for managers and unions to bargain over were now limited by the 
prior budgetary decisions of central government, political strategies were now even more 
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important than previously as a supplement to industrial strategies for both unions and 
employers. If more was to be gained by the unions, the government's spending 
constraint on the health sector would have to be lifted. This had a paradoxical effect. 
While the State Sector Act was designed to remove government from the negotiating 
process, its attempts to tightly limit outcomes set a premium on attempts to shift the 
Government's position. -
This point had particular importance in the health sector because of the legacy of the 
1985 negotiations. Then, Ministers had involved themselves directly in the negotiations 
with junior doctors and nurses, reaching agreements which undercut the official positions 
of their negotiators. In 1988 this encouraged unions to believe that at the last moment 
Ministers would again intervene to arrange a favourable settlement. For the general 
managers it opened the unnerving possibility of being undercut by political intervention. 
Unions 
On the union side, the State Sector Act was widely interpreted as having weakened 
their strategic position. The campaign against the legislation had absorbed union 
energies and resources to a remarkable degree. This campaign had been followed 
immediately by exhausting transitional negotiations to codify conditions of employment 
within awards and agreements. Turmoil associated with the wider process of state 
restructuring which had begun in 1985 continued to preoccupy the PSA. In the health 
sector itself, the implementation of area health board legislation and the impact of the 
Hospital Taskforce Report, chaired by Alan Gibbs (Gibbs, Fraser and Scott, 1988), 
fuelled fears of drastic restructuring and accompanying job losses. The Budget cast further 
gloom. 
Pursuing an industrial strategy under the State Sector Act required that unions 
effectively mobilise their members. In the health sector, unions' estimates of their 
ability to do this varied. The Service Workers Federation (SWF), representing 
predominantly kitchen staff, cleaners and orderlies, were confident that their members 
would support industrial action. For the Public Service Association (PSA), representing 
a diverse mix of occupations (for example, psychiatric nurses, social workers, 
physiotherapists, speech therapists and public health nurses) the picture was more mixed. 
While some of their members, in particular the psychiatric nurses, could be counted on to 
support industrial action, there were doubts about the degree of support available from 
others. The New Zealand Nurses Association (NZNA) were least confident of all. Their 
members constituted a majority of health sector workers and were likely to bear the brunt 
of any health sector restructuring. The clash between a professional ethic -of 
responsibility to patients and a union ethic of worker solidarity made their mobilisation 
problematic. 
Unions faced a common environment of budgetary restraint and health sector 
restructuring as threats to their members' jobs and living standards. The emergence of 
these pressures prompted union cooperation. The Combined Health Employees 
Committee (CHEC) had been initially formed in response to the replacement of hospital 
boards by area health boards. This required joint activity by unions, as well as the 
resolution of coverage problems as former central government employees shifted to the 
area health boards. As more area health boards were formed, CHEC expanded, and by 
1988 it was a national organisation which operated at site and regional levels. By then, 
budgetary pressures were another important factor in promoting union cooperation. The 
"Nurses are worth more" campaign of 1985-86 involved considerable public sector union 
cooperation. 
As pressures on the health sector intensified, CHEC became a focal point for a union 
campaign for the preservation and effective development of the public health system. 
CHEC's formation and development was an explicit recognition that the future of public 
health and the jobs and living standards of union members were tightly intertwined. 
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Their protection required a political strategy, to rally public support and thus put pressure 
on regional and national government, as much as an industrial one. Unions in Auckland 
had achieved some measure of political success with their participation in the 
Community Health Coalition which gained four seats on the Area Health Board in 1986. 
By 1988-89, however, political activity needed to be as much nationally as regionally fo-
cussed. Indeed, unions recognised that their capacity to sustain industrial action in health 
depended importantly upon public sympathy for the plight of the public health system 
and, by implication, that of the workers employed there. By the 1988-89 wage round, 
CHEC had given the different union officials and delegates involved a sense of common 
problems and experience in developing joint strategies. The meetings of union advocates 
called by the Council of Trade Unions (CfU) before the pay round were another forum in 
which health sector unions were able to focus on common problems. 
The union approach to the round was shaped by their recognition of the fact of hard 
budgets and the certainty of continuing restructuring. Common problems and joint 
consultation meant considerable overlap among union claims on some issues. However, 
initial cooperation among the unions was immeasurably less than it would become 
subsequently. Two issues became paramount as the dispute developed. The first was the 
pay claim itself which was tilted toward lower paid workers and reflected the unions' 
understanding that they would not win major pay increases. (The tilt toward lower paid 
workers was a response to the tax changes of October 1988 which had favoured the higher 
paid). Secondly, unions sought to ensure that they would have an active role in the 
workplace. This was in part a response to continued restructuring and to the State 
Services Commission's (SSC) promotion of a 'management culture' in the state sector. 
A particular concern for the PSA was the SSC's attempts to remove senior management 
from the coverage of collective agreements and employ them on individual contracts. The 
PSA's position was that a weakening of union organisation, such as this would entail, 
made necessary compensating changes to the role of the union in the workplace. This 
was expressed in its industrial democracy claims. These were designed to give unions a 
voice, so far denied them, in decisions on state restructuring. For their part, the SWF, in 
response to looming restructuring, had been trying unsuccessfully for some time to 
persuade the Government and the Boards to agree to a proposal to implement joint union/ 
management effectiveness studies to evaluate hospital operation and identify areas where 
improvements might be made. For its part, NZN A was less enthusiastic about these 
issues, but went along with the other two in the interests of the wider union alliance. 
Employers 
The Area Health Board Amendment Act, passed as an adjunct to the State Sector Act, 
reconstituted the employers' side of the bargaining table. The Health Services Personnel 
Commission, the previous employing authority, had been abolished. The State Services 
Commission had become the employer party for the negotiation of pay and conditions of 
employment. The Commission was required to consult with the General Managers of 
each board (who had also been given new powers and responsibilities by the legislation) 
and the Director-General of Health, and could, if it chose, delegate its responsibilites to 
the General Managers. This shared jurisdiction and common interests were given 
operational form in the regular liaison between the General Managers Industrial 
Committee and the SSC during the negotiations. 
The initial strategy meeting to determine employer response to the union claims was 
held in Christchurch. It brought together the SSC, general managers, industrial relations 
specialists from the boards, representatives of the Health Department and the Hospital 
Boards Association. The meeting was not well attended by general managers themselves. 
This reflected the enormous number of other tasks, particularly those associated with the 
shift to area health board status, that faced general managers at the time. 
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At the meeting, the general managers were told finnly by central government officials 
that no more money would be forthcoming from the Government to finance any pay 
settlement. The employers' meeting was effective in determining a common position 
that remained unchanged until almost the very end of the negotiations. Arguing that the 
hard budget constraint meant real pay increases could only be funded by job losses, the 
employers made a nil pay offer coupled with claw back claims affecting payments for call 
backs, penal rates for night and holiday work and other matters. They ~so sought to 
remove senior nurses and senior management from coverage of the collective agreement. 
The employers' claims were as important for what they on:titted as for .what they i~cluded. 
Employers were aware of the SWFs enthusiasm for effectiveness studies and consider~ a 
paper at the Christchurch meeting which evaluated their merits, drawing o.n the Australian 
experience in Victoria. They concluded that they would not trade off pay mcreases for the 
promise of union-management effectiveness studies designed to fund those increases. 
While the unions' industrial and political strategies reinforced each other, for the 
boards they were contradictory. While the credibility of the general managers' industrial 
strategy depended upon the Government's firm resolve not to provide additional funds, the 
elected boards had good reason to press the Government for more. Additional funds would 
placate the unions, ensure the preservation of regional health services and protect the~r 
election prospects, all at the expense of central government. So long as boards took this 
position publicly, unions were encouraged to believe that the industrial position 
advocated by general managers would be undercut politically. However, the boards' 
political strategy was conducted in an unplanned and sporadic way through the appeals of 
different elected boards for more government funding. Along with the unions' similar 
attempts, it yielded no success. 
The general managers' industrial strategy had much more impact. It mobilised union 
members and drew the unions more deeply into a joint strategy. The spectre of claw backs 
(especially offensive to the unions was the initial proposal to reduce sick leave 
entitlement) on top of a nil pay offer changed the perceptions of many health workers and 
served as an important organising weapon for unions. Although some differences in 
readiness to take direct action remained, the balance had shifted towards militancy. 
The conduct of the industrial campaign 
Union officials' perceptions were also changed by the employers' strategy and its effect 
on workers. They faced a common set of claims; they feared a divide and rule strategy by 
employers trying to settle separately with one union and playing it off against the others; 
and they were aware that their members were much closer than before in their willingness 
to take action. This combination added up to pressing reasons for cooperation among 
unions. Nonetheless, coordinated action was no sure thing. 
Divisions abounded within and among the three unions, the PSA, SWF and NZNA-
state and private sector, white-collar and blue-collar, low-paid and better-paid, industrial 
and professional orientation. These were reflected in different membership and decision-
making structures and varied cultures. The PSA and the NZNA were national centralised 
unions, whilst the SWF was a federation of autonomous regional unions. Where the 
SWF and the PSA were coalitions of diverse occupational groups, the NZNA represented 
a single craft. The SWF was oriented to membership mobilisation and industrial action; 
the NZNA saw itself as having a professional orientation and shunned reliance upon 
industrial action; the PSA fell in between with sections of its health membership, 
especially the psychiatric nurses, more akin in their approach to the SWF and others 
reluctant to take industrial action. 
Union officials cooperated in designing a public relations offensive, the 'Squeeze' 
campaign, aimed to convince their members that they should not be hostages to 
Government 'underfunding' of the public health system. This provided further valuable 
experience in inter-union cooperation and helped lay the basis for more formal 
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coordination of their overall campaign. By December, the unions had taken the major 
step of harmonising their claims and had devised a joint campaign which would carry 
them through to the end of the dispute. This cooperation was premised on inter-union 
compromises which required continual renewal; consequently its endurance and that of the 
joint industrial campaign was never guaranteed. Another reason for its fragility was the 
'liability of newness'. None of the unions had ever run a joint campaign of this kind 
before and they learned, sometimes with difficulty, how to do it as they went along. 
Cooperation was to occur at the local and regional levels as well as nationally. The 
campaign had both industrial and political dimensions. Politically, the unions would 
continue to try to influence public opinion on the need for resources and thus to shift 
Government. The final aspect of the political strategy was to arrange meetings with 
Ministers. This was based as much on a need to demonstrate to union members 
(especially nurses) and to the public that no stone had been left untumed in the union 
effort to reach a compromise as on any realistic hope of shifting the Government. 
Industrially, unions built upon their members' anger at the employers' position. The 
campaign was organised around joint stop-work meetings on January 25 which voted 
overwhelmingly for a 24 hour strike on February 14 followed by a 48 hour strike on 
February 22, if no settlement had been reached. The length of the proposed strikes was a 
compromise among the unions, with the SWF firmly supporting more prolonged action. 
The Council of Trade Unions played a key role in sustaining the joint union 
campaign, and later in resolving the dispute. Just as new legislation brought new 
institutions, and gave rise to novel strategies and possibilities, so too the formation of 
the CTU in 1988 opened up alternative strategies not previously available to unions. 
The CTU offered a forum in which unions could temporarily put aside their differences 
and cooperate. It was a safe place, especially for the PSA and NZNA, still unsure of their 
ground in the new environment. Its appeal derived heavily from strong relations of 
personal trust and respect among key union and CTU officials (pointing to the way in 
which organisational relationships are typically embedded in personal networks and social 
relations). Similar cooperation would have been unlikely prior to the formation of the 
CTU, with the SWF affiliated to the Federation of Labour (FOL) and the PSA and NZNA 
to the Combined State Unions (CSU). Moreover, in the past, state and private sector 
unions operated under different wage-fixing procedures, making a joint campaign even 
more difficult. CHEC was an alternative national forum for joint action. Although the 
SWF might have preferred this, the PSA and NZNA did not. They felt more confident of 
their capacity to shape events in a CTU forum. What is more, both PSA and NZNA 
wanted CHEC to become a constituent unit of the CTU and were not about to work 
through it in preference to CTU structures. Nonetheless, regional and local CHECs 
played an important role in the coordinated implementation of the national campaign. 
The CTU became involved informally in December as the unions began to develop 
their joint campaign. By January, its participation was formal and continuous, and by 
the time negotiations began in earnest to settle the dispute just before the 24 hour strike, 
they did so under the auspices of the CTU. While some general managers and their 
industrial relations staff had anticipated a joint union campaign and CTU involvement, to 
others it came as a surprise. General mangers were now faced with the need to develop a 
new strategic response. When this consideration occurred, it revealed divisions among the 
employers. 
These divisions arose from the different impact of strike action on the large, 
metropolitan boards compared to its impact on small and medium boards. Large boards, 
much more than the others, had good reason to fear strike action. Their workforces were 
more committed to union action. Their relationships with their communities were less 
direct and hence they were less sure they would be able to ensure adequate numbers of 
volunteers in the event of a strike. The range of services provided by large boards was 
much greater and the complexity and scale of the tasks required of volunteers meant they 
were often of little use. They were also responsible for psychiatric hospitals which in 
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some cases posed special difficulties for the maintenance of social order. General 
managers of large boards were also haunted by the possibility of a 'normal accident', by 
which they did not mean a major disaster but a moderately common event in a large city 
such as a motorway pile-up. Small and medium-sized boards, on the other hand, were 
generally confident that they could sustain even prolonged strike action. They thought 
that unions would not be very successful in getting members to strike in their boards. 
Equally, they were confident that if a strike occurred, volunteers would be able to fill any 
gaps that appeared. These differences between larger and smaller boards overlapped with 
others. While health workers in provincial towns may have to put up with whatever 
wages and conditions they can get, health workers in the main centres may have other 
alternatives available to them. The result of these differences was considerable. While 
the general managers of the large boards, especially after the 24 hour strike, pushed for a 
settlement, they found themselves opposed by some of the representatives of the smaller 
boards. 
Similarly, the prospect and then the reality of a strike threatened to jeopardise the 
Government's interests in the dispute. These were essentially three-fold. First, the 
Government wanted to minimise political damage from the conduct of the dispute. 
Second, it was determined to preserve its fiscal policy line and not fund a settlement by 
further budgetary allocations. And, finally, the Government wished to see the new public 
sector management system it had introduced work and be seen to work well. The 
Government would achieve this in part by hard budgets and by new management systems. 
But it also relied heavily upon the central directive role in industrial relations of the SSe 
as the employer party. Its direction, backed up by a Ministerial sub-committee which 
monitored developments, allowed the infusion of specific industrial relations expertise and 
sought to ensure that the Government's immediate interests were protected. For its part, 
the sse was conscious that its own role sat uneasily with the decentralised managerialist 
philosophy in the Act. Its future depended upon the Government's continued judgement 
that a central employer role for the sse best served Government interests. 
The Government's strategy was always high risk. Even as hard budgets seemed to 
underpin the employers' stance, the Government's political vulnerability threatened the 
strategy's credibility. The joint union campaign and the 24 hour strike raised the awful 
possibility of public uproar and of responsibility not just for deficiencies in the health 
system but for strikes and deaths being sheeted home to the Government. The public 
would blame unions for deaths seen to arise from the strike action, but they would also 
certainly blame the Government. Strikes, as we have seen, also carried high risks for all 
but the general managers of the smaller boards. The Government, and the SSe as its 
agent, made common cause with the general managers of large boards and looked for a 
settlement. 
Negotiations resumed on a joint basis with all unions sitting together on one side 
instead of the separate talks the SSe had insisted on until that stage3. This allowed 
negotiations to focus on a general settlement for the health sector. However, the only 
settlement on offer from the unions included participation by unions in the restructuring 
process. The shadow of imminent catastrophe in the affairs of the Auckland board had 
hung over the latter stages of the negotiations. Moreover, all were aware it would be 
only the first of a series of radical reorganisations. Thus, for the unions, the priority had 
become effectiveness studies. These appeared inconsistent with the Government's public 
sector management objectives as set out in the State Sector Act. (However, the 
Government had also committed itself to industrial democracy, and the Minister of Health 
had made public statements about the need for union involvement in rationalising the 
3 Some union participants have suggested that this important change resulted directly 
from Ministerial direction. Employer participants disagree. This may reflect different 
judgements about what constitutes Ministerial direction. 
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health sector.) Not surprisingly, the general managers initially resisted this claim as an 
unacceptable encroachment upon their managerial prerogatives. 
The settlement 
The employers' acceptance of effectiveness studies ensured an overall settlement was 
reached. The previously contentious issue of pay was resolved fairly easily. The pay 
settlement fitted into the broad pattern in the state sector of favouring lower paid workers. 
Employers agreed that no redundancies would occur in the financial year ending June 30 
1989 as a direct result of the wage settlement. Boards further agreed they would do their 
best after June 30 to avoid redundancies as a result of the settlement. elawbacks were 
taken off the table. However, many of the matters they raised were consigned to 
discussion by joint working parties, pointing to their likely return in subsequent rounds. 
Each union was to return to separate conciliation negotiations to resolve details of their 
individual awards. Finally, union pressure for involvement in restructuring was met 
through a Protocol which comprised four elements. The first was an industrial democracy 
clause along the lines of those negotiated by the PSA in the public service. The 
employers accepted the need for employee consultation. Union delegates, who were 
guaranteed paid time off for this role, were to be the recognised channel of 
communication. Second, there was an agreement on joint union/management 
effectiveness studies to begin on July 1, 1989. These would review systems and work 
methods. They were to be preceded by a series of pilot studies whose results were to be 
available by June 15. The third component of the Protocol concerned the management of 
change. Employers agreed to involve unions in any reviews which might lead to changes 
in structure, staffing or work practices affecting employees. The final component was an 
agreement on staff surplus which provided procedures and options to be followed in the 
event of redundancies. 
The wording of the settlement, particularly the Protocol, leaves it open to diverse 
interpretations. This wording was not for the most part inadvertent but reflected the 
urgent need of both sides to reach agreement so as to forestall a second strike. It appears 
inconsistent with the Government's public sector management objectives but its 
ambiguity is such that whether this is the case or not will only become clear through the 
process of implementation. Already significant differences of interpretation have surfaced. 
Some union officials believe that management can make no changes without extensive 
union input, while some managers believe that simply notifying the unions that changes 
will be made is all that is required. Also, the fiscal pressures on boards mean that major 
changes are being made, most dramatically in Auckland, under the management of change 
provisions, separate from the development of effectiveness studies. 
The settlement stored up problems but at the same time revealed opportunities for the 
future. For unions, the pay settlement narrowed pay differentials. If the PSA and NZNA 
seek to restore those differentials this may make joint membership action with the SWF 
more difficult. The clawback provisions will undoubtedly return. The unions, like the 
elected boards, were unable to shift the government on the overall level of health sector 
funding. On the other hand unions gained experience in working together on an industry 
basis and despite tensions and difficulties, had enough success to provide incentives to 
work together in future. This possibility is recognised more formally in current 
proposals for union reorganization. The legacy of the Protocol remains uncertain. It 
may be revealed as a document that allowed effective union management cooperation in a 
time of massive restructuring. On the other hand the danger for unions is that it may 
tum out to be a means of their cooptation by management. This is possible if union 
representatives on the studies lack the expertise to play an equal part with management. 
If the outcomes are seen as those for which management was pressing anyway, but now 
with union acquiescence, unions may be discredited in the eyes of their members. 
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Employers too face a mixed legacy from the settlement. Just as for the unions, if the 
Protocol is potentially a means for effective workplace cooperation it is also a potential 
means of cooptation that, in this case, would undermine management discretion. 
Employers did manage to work together effectively to limit the pay settlement and to get 
working parties set up on the clawbacks. On the other hand, strike action by the 
combined unions emphasised differences between larger and smaller boards, making future 
collaboration more difficult. 
For the Government, the settlement preserved their fiscal policy and protected them 
from direct political damage from health sector upheaval. On the other hand, the goal of 
management autonomy emphasised by the State Sector Act may have been compromised. 
The likelihood of strikes in future health sector disputes should also cause disquiet. 
Governments may not always be so fortunate in enjoying immunity from their 
consequences. 
Conclusions 
The health sector dispute gave rise to events and outcomes not foreseen by any of the 
participants. What happened was not however simply the result of random accident. 
Instead the reordering of resources and strategies among participants, a reordering 
embedded in the procedures of the State Sector Act, explained (but did not determine) the 
particular way in which the process unfolded through the interaction of unions, employers 
and Government. 
Just as the initial differences among unions and their uncertainty about their members' 
responses explained the lack of uniformity of union claims and their relative modesty, so 
the initial confidence and unity of employers, and the hard budgets they sought to meet, 
explained the far reaching scope and the relative uniformity of the claims employers made 
in response. In tum the perceived extremity of these claims, together with their 
uniformity, provided an initial basis for union cooperation. This was strengthened 
through the growing involvement of the CTU. Union cooperation then opened the way 
to a widening of union demands for participation in the restructuring process and coupled 
this with the threat of widespread industrial action. Industrial action acted as a wedge 
dividing the interests of the Government and large employers, on one side, from those of 
smaller boards on the other, and greatly increased the pressure on all participants, except 
some of the smaller boards, to find a settlement. The result was an evening up of 
bargaining strength, reflected in the final settlement. During the course of the 
negotiations, the unions' capacity for effective joint action grew while that of employers 
was to some extent diminished. 
The negotiating process also revealed crucial ambiguities in the role of Government. 
The State Sector Act sought to let governments distance themselves from the state sector 
industrial relations process, yet allow them tight control over the outcomes. Just as the 
aims were to some extent contradictory, so too were the outcomes that were generated. 
Thus the Government's use of hard budgets to strengthen managerial resolve and to limit 
its expenditure did tightly restrict the outcomes that were possible from the industrial 
negotiations and did so without direct ministerial participation. But the use of hard 
budgets also led to attempts by elected boards and unions to bring influence to bear 
directly on the government itself. These attempts were unsuccessful - this time. Their 
lack of success seems as much to reflect the novelty of the new procedures and the fact 
that no public catastrophe occurred as a result of strike action, as any enduring feature of 
the process. 
The fragility of the separation of government from the outcomes of industrial 
bargaining also brought government directly, but covertly, into the industrial negotiating 
process. (This was formally, but not publicly acknowledged, by Government through the 
setting up of the ministerial sub-committee to monitor the state pay round, including 
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health. The vicissitudes of the parliamentary life meant that by the end, only one of its 
original members remained). It is not hard to see why this fragility should be so in the 
health sector. Once industrial action had occurred, like the large boards and the unions, 
the Government had good reason to seek a quick settlement (albeit one within its overall 
fiscal policy). None of them, especially not the Government, were likely to escape 
blame for any catastrophe that might ensue. The Government was not and could not be 
indifferent to the need for a settlement and, despite the fictions of the State Sector Act, 
seems to have instructed the sse accordingly. 
Ambiguities in the State Sector Act were also revealed by the settlement's Protocol, 
with its emphasis on the role of unions in the management of change in the health 
sector. The State Sector Act's provisions for increasing managerial autonomy and 
responsibility, ironically, set in motion a process in which unions came to demand a 
greater say in management, a demand that potentially undermines the Act's raison d'etre. 
This is not accidental. Government's tight control of the amount of money available for 
bargaining focussed the attention of unions and employers on the restructuring of the 
health sector and inevitably, on union participation in this process. 
Postscript 
The events discussed in this paper will not be repeated in the 1989-90 wage round. In 
October 1989, the major health sector documents were all rolled over, providing for a two 
percent wage increase, no change in conditions and a shortened term. The documents are 
due for renewal again in the second half of 1990. A methodology for effectiveness studies 
has been agreed to. A union-based effectiveness unit has been set up, funded by the 
Department of Health. 
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Managerial views on compulsory unionism 
in New Zealand 
A J Geare* 
The New Zealand industrial relations literature contains a number of propositions 
concerning the impact or desirability of having compulsory union membership. This 
paper discusses the propositions, and reports on the response of a sample of 461 New 
Zealand managers, examining the significance of their attitudes. 
Introduction 
Compulsory unionism, either by statute or by agreement, has played a significant role 
in New Zealand industrial relations for over half a century. At various stages the views 
of the New Zealand Employers' Federation (NZEF) on compulsory unionism have been 
made known. (The NZEF was anti in 1936, but had swung completely to be pro in 
1951, 1961, and the 1970's. It had a second swing to again be anti in 1984). However, 
the views of New Zealand managers have not received much publicity. This paper 
attempts to redress the problem and is an examination of managerial, as opposed to 
NZEF, views on compulsory unionism. 
Given the number of accounts already in the literature (Szakats, 1972; Howells, 1983; 
Geare, 1984) most readers will be familiar with New Zealand's experience with 
compulsory unionism. However it should be noted that from 1936-1961 there was 
compulsory unionism by law; from 1961-1984 and 1985-present, compulsory unionism 
"by agreement" (union-management) or, failing that, by majority vote of the workforce. 
From 1984-5, there was a brief period of voluntary unionism, by law. 
This paper examines 7 of the more common propositions in the literature concerning 
compulsory unionism and discusses the attitudes of a sample of 461 New Zealand 
managers to those propositions. It also gives the attitudes to the general questions as to 
whether compulsory unionism should be encouraged, tolerated or discouraged. 
Method 
The research study replicates an earlier study undertaken in Australia. It involved 
sending a multi-faceted questionnaire to 995 managers throughout New Zealand. The 
managers had been selected by name and position from the New Zealand Business Who's 
Who 1984-5 using systematic sampling to give a spread of position, seniority and 
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